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Abstract
Plagiarism detection systems are essential tools for safeguarding aca-
demic and educational integrity. However, todays systems require dis-
closing the full content of the input documents and the document collec-
tion to which the input documents are compared. Moreover, the systems
are centralized and under the control of individual, typically commercial
providers. This situation raises procedural and legal concerns regarding
the confidentiality of sensitive data, which can limit or prohibit the use
of plagiarism detection services. To eliminate these weaknesses of cur-
rent systems, we seek to devise a plagiarism detection approach that does
not require a centralized provider nor exposing any content as cleartext.
This paper presents the initial results of our research. Specifically, we em-
ploy Private Set Intersection to devise a content-protecting variant of the
citation-based similarity measure Bibliographic Coupling implemented in
our plagiarism detection system HyPlag. Our evaluation shows that the
content-protecting method achieves the same detection effectiveness as the
original method while making common attacks to disclose the protected
content practically infeasible. Our future work will extend this success-
ful proof-of-concept by devising plagiarism detection methods that can
analyze the entire content of documents without disclosing it as cleartext.
1 Introduction
Plagiarism, i.e., the unacknowledged reuse of ideas or content, is a severe form of
academic misconduct. Today, educational and research institutions, academic
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publishers, and funding agencies increasingly rely on plagiarism detection sys-
tems (PDS) to identify plagiarized content [21]. Typical PDS require users to
submit input documents, which the systems then compare to a large, typically
proprietary database of documents. The systems retrieve documents with simi-
lar content as the input document and highlight the similar content to support
user inspection [4].
Researchers and practitioners have criticized PDS for their poor detection
accuracy and opaque computations [21], as well as their centralized and non-
transparent data management [20, p. 72ff.]. In past research, we have addressed
the first issue. We improved detection rates for heavily disguised instances
of academic plagiarism by integrating the analysis of text-independent content
elements, such as academic citations, images, and mathematical content with
text-based detection methods into the hybrid plagiarism detection system Hy-
Plag [14]. In this paper, we focus on the second issue.
Disclosing the full content of input and comparison documents to a cen-
tral service provider whose detection methods and data protection measures
are nontransparent, inherently raises concerns regarding the security and con-
fidentiality of sensitive data, e.g., in unpublished research grant proposals or
research theses compiled in cooperation with companies. The mere disclosure
of such content to a third party can violate non-disclosure agreements, as well
as data protection and copyright laws [20, p. 73f.]. Such legal concerns can limit
the use of plagiarism detection systems. The general risk of data breaches fur-
ther aggravates the problem. In Germany, many universities, therefore, prohibit
the use of PDS entirely.
As we described in our vision paper [8], we seek to address the weaknesses of
current PDS by devising a blockchain-backed decentralized approach to plagia-
rism detection (PD) that does not require disclosing any content as cleartext.
As a first step towards this vision, this paper reports on devising a content-
protecting variant of the citation-based similarity measure Bibliographic Cou-
pling (BC) [10] implemented in our PDS HyPlag [14]. We present an approach
to securely mask bibliographic references and an adaption of the Private Set In-
tersection (PSI) approach to compute the bibliographic coupling strength (BCS)
of papers without revealing the cleartext of the references.
2 Related Work
Our research shall enable plagiarism detection systems to identify similar con-
tent in documents without disclosing the content. Data security research has
yielded two approaches to protect content while allowing the identification of
the cleartext: Revertible functions (encryption) and lossy one-way functions
(hashing).
Encryption is conceptually less secure than hashing because the encrypted
content contains the full information of the cleartext. A malicious party can gain
access to the cleartext by obtaining the decryption key. Additionally, encryption
methods considered secure today can become vulnerable in the future due to
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undiscovered flaws or increases in computing power [2].
Hash functions are lossy one-way functions that map cleartext of any size to
a fixed-sized value (hash). Due to the lossy mapping, the cleartext cannot be
recomputed from the hash. The only option for a malicious party to ascertain
the correspondence of a hash and the cleartext is to guess the possible cleartext,
compute its hash, and compare it to the hashes disclosed for a document. This
approach, known as a preimage attack, is feasible if the set of hash inputs is
finite and known [18]. Privacy-focused messaging applications like Signal face a
similar problem called private contact discovery due to the finite set of phone
numbers [11]. Signal solved this issue by performing PSI using a secured part
of the CPU [12]. This solution does not apply to our distributed detection use
case, as it still requires trust in the hardware underlying the service.
Researchers predominantly employed hashing to detect document similarity
without revealing the documents’ content.
The work of Unger et al. [19] is most related to ours since it also protects the
content of documents during the plagiarism detection process. Their approach
relies on a central authority (root node) that manages the access of peripheral
nodes to content in the distributed system. The peripheral nodes represent
documents as word chunks, which the nodes process using a collision-resistant
hash function with a globally shared salt. The computed hashes are added to a
count-min sketch [3] for tracking the frequency of word chunks in the document.
The count-min sketches are shared with the root node and can be queried by the
peripheral nodes. The privacy of all communication within the system is secured
using the TLS protocol, with the root node acting as a certificate authority.
While the approach greatly improves the confidentiality of content compared to
traditional PDS, the count-min sketches are vulnerable to dictionary attacks.
Moreover, the root node receives meta-data about documents, which can include
the documents’ subject matter and information on the authors’ writing style.
Murugesan et al. [16] proposed the use of bloom filters in combination with
hashes to protect the semantic meaning of content but maintain knowledge
about the content’s composition to perform similarity detection tasks. Bloom-
filters are conceptually related to count-min sketches. Garbled Boom Filters
track the frequency of content chunks in a document using a fixed-sized map
while filling the empty positions with noise.
A drawback that all of the aforementioned hash-based approaches share is
their vulnerability to preimage attacks. Furthermore, the approaches rely on a
central authority.
Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMPC) [7] describes methods that over-
come the need for a central authority. In SMPC, parties jointly compute a
function over inputs, which the parties keep private. Most SMPC protocols,
however, require translating all computations to binary circuits [17]. Employ-
ing SMPC for plagiarism detection would thus require new implementations of
PD methods.
Many PD tasks represent an exchange of data between two instead of n par-
ties, hence do not require the application of elaborate SMPC protocols. Instead,
the tasks can be solved using the Private Set Intersection (PSI) [1] approach.
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PSI allows two parties to compare private versions of their sets of data with-
out revealing information to third parties. Hashing is the core of PSI. Many
PD tasks exclusively require ascertaining the existence of identical features in
documents of two parties. Hence, we consider PSI as promising for developing
content-protecting versions of PD methods.
3 Method
In this paper, we consider bibliographic references as the only content to be
compared confidentially. The bibliographic coupling algorithm considers the
sets of references in the input and comparison document Rd and R
′
d to compute
the document similarity score bibliographic coupling strength (sBC) as
sBC (Rd, R
′
d) =
|Rd ∩R′d|
|Rd ∪R′d|
=
|Rd ∩R′d|
|Rd|+ |Rd′ | − |Rd ∩R′d|
. (1)
Employing simple hashing to protect the confidentiality of bibliographic ref-
erences is prone to preimage attacks as the number of published papers, and
hence the number of possible references is finite. An attacker could acquire
the metadata of most or all references, pre-compute their hashes and compare
the pre-computed hashes of arbitrary references to the hashes of a protected
document to deduce the topical context of the document.
To prevent preimage attacks for our use case, we hash combinations of k
references instead of single references and only disclose the resulting set of com-
bined hashes to the detection service. Without loss of generality, we assume
that a preprocessing of references has been completed before forming the sub-
sets. We further assume that the preprocessing step i) eliminated any duplicates
in the reference lists of individual documents, ii) disambiguated all references
in the collection, iii) stored the disambiguated references as a hashable data
structure, and iv) excluded documents that contain less than k references from
the similarity computation.
We form all k-combinations. For example, if a document contains three
references {a, b, c} and we seek to form reference subsets of cardinality k = 2, we
would form, e.g., the subsets {a, b}, {a, c}, and {b, c} but not {a, a}. Formally,
we form the reference subsets
Pk(Rd) =
{
r ⊆ Rd
∣
∣ |U | = k} (2)
with cardinality |Pk(Rd)| =
(
|Rd|
k
)
. Growing the set of possible hashes by a
power of k increases the cost of a preimage attack but also the complexity of the
detection process. Moreover, document pairs must contain at least k common
references to exhibit a similarity that the content-protecting BC method can
detect.
To mask the cleartext of references, we compute the set of hashes
Hd =
{
H(r)
∣
∣r ∈ Pk(Rd)
}
. (3)
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Here H(r) =
∑k
i=1 H(ri) denotes the hash function over the subset of ref-
erences r ⊆ Rd. For the case k = 1, H(r) yields the hashes of the individual
references, i.e., Hd = {H (r1) , H (r2) , . . . , H (rn)} .
The detection service performs a private set intersection of the hashes from
the input document and the hashes from previously submitted documents H ′d
to compute the private BCS as
sPBC (Hd, Hd′) =
|Hd ∩Hd′ |
|Hd ∪Hd′ | . (4)
Similarly, one can derive sBC (Hd, Hd′) via
sBC (Hd, Hd′) =
ak (Hd ∩Hd′)
ak(Hd) + ak(Hd′)− ak (|Hd ∩Hd′) , (5)
where ak(j) is the numeric solution for j =
(
ak(j)
k
)
. For example, for k = 2 one
can derive ak(j) =
1
2 (1 +
√
8j + 1).
After comparing the hashes of an input document to the hashes of the corpus,
we retrieve potential sources by ranking all corpus documents in descending
order of their maximum sPBC and filter for matches exclusively occurring in one
document pair.
4 Experiments
Our experiments analyze the effectiveness, consumption of computational re-
sources, and resistance to preimage attacks for our content-protecting version
of the BC algorithm.
4.1 Experimental Setup
We conducted our experiments on a dataset of 105,120 arXiv documents, into
which we embedded ten confirmed cases of plagiarism, each consisting of the
plagiarized document and one source document. We used the same dataset in
previous work [15]. We excluded documents without processable reference data
and documents with more than 150 references. The final dataset contained
92,082 documents and 1,726,359 unique bibliographic references.
In a preprocessing step, we used the open-source software GROBID1 to con-
vert all documents into the uniform TEI-format2. TEI employs XML to struc-
ture the documents’ content and allows for easy extraction of the bibliographic
references.
Initial tests showed that the title field has the highest probability of being
present in the reference string. Therefore, we used the normalized title field for
the hashing. To decide on a hash function to use, we counted the number of
hash collisions resulting from applying Adler32, SHA1, and SHA256 for hashing
1https://github.com/kermitt2/grobid
2https://tei-c.org/
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Table 1: Hash generation for 92,082 documents.
k-Tuple Hashes Time in sec Size in GB
k = 1 1,726,359 21 0.185
k = 2 45,951,328 31 2.5
k = 3 1,848,313,500 258 126
all reference subsets of size 3 in 5,000 documents. Only Adler32 yielded hash
collisions (1,320), i.e., mappings of different inputs to the same hash, due to
the comparably smaller size of its hashes (32-bits). We thus chose SHA1 as it
offers sufficient collision resistance (280) and is faster to compute than SHA256.
Collisions would cause false positives and, thus, an unnecessary effort for human
reviewers.
4.2 Results
Effectiveness. To compare the effectiveness of PBC to the original BC method,
we computed sPBC and sBC for all ten test cases in our dataset using subset
sizes of 1, 2, and 3, respectively. We found that for both k = 2 and k = 3, the
similarity scores computed by PBC and BC were equal for all test cases. This
result shows that PBC detects identical references equally well as BC.
Resource Consumption. To assess the computational effort of our content-
protecting PBCmethod, we analyzed the computation time and storage required
for computing sPBC depending on the size of k. We divided the analysis into
two steps.
In the first step, we assessed the time and storage required for computing
and storing the hashed reference subsets. ?? shows the results for analyzing the
entire dataset of 92,082 documents using different sizes of k. The results show
that the exponential growth of the space required for storing hashed reference
subsets is the limiting factor for using larger subset sizes.
In the second step, we assessed the time required for performing the private
set intersection of the hashed reference subsets depending on k. For this anal-
ysis, we only used 1,000 documents from our dataset. ?? shows the number of
all hashes and the fraction of those hashes that occur in one, two, and three
documents, respectively. The table also shows the time required for applying
PBC to compute the bibliographic coupling strength of the input document
with a comparison document. For increasing values of k, the number of hashes
occurring in more than one document decays rapidly. For k = 1, 86% of the
references occur in one document only. Combinations of three references are
unique in 99.3% of the cases. The increase in required computation time is
almost constant in the number of hashes due to the use of indexes.
Resistance to Preimage Attacks. To motivate the resistance of PBC to
preimage attacks, we estimate the computation time required to perform such
an attack, using computer science publications as an example. As explained
in ??, a preimage attack requires knowing the possible hash inputs, i.e., in our
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Table 2: Detection against 1,000 documents
k-Tuple Hashes Ratio in 1/2/3 docs Time in ms
k = 1 22,658 .86/.07/.03 98
k = 2 357,765 .98/.02/.001 103
k = 3 5,250,076 .99/.01/.0 118
case, the possible references in academic documents. To estimate the number of
possible references for computer science, we use the dblp bibliography3, which is
the most comprehensive collection of bibliographic records for journal articles,
conference papers, and monographs in this field. As of May 2020, dblp contains
5.05 million records.
For k = 1, a preimage attack on a single computer science document requires
computing
(
5.05×106
1
)
= 5.05× 106 hashes, i.e., a time complexity of O(nk).
Assuming a computing time of 1ms per hash would result in a single-threaded
runtime of 5.05× 103s ≈ 1.40h. Analogously, for k = 2, computing (5.05×1062
) ≈
12.75× 1012 hashes requires a single-threaded runtime of more than 404 years
and more than 680 million years for k = 3. We see these numbers as conservative
lower-bound estimates of the effort required because our calculation ignores i)
interdisciplinary citations, ii) citations to sources not formally published, such
as websites, code libraries, and datasets, and iii) the inevitable incompleteness
of dblp4.
The time complexity of O(nk) for performing a preimage attack on a single
document makes this attack too costly for k ≥ 2 if the attacker cannot limit the
possible references significantly, e.g., to a narrow research field. For example, for
k = 2 and x = 30,000 possible references, the attack requires a single-threaded
runtime of approx. 125h for one document. For k = 3, the required single-
threaded runtime exceeds 100h per document for x ≥ 1,300. We hypothesize
that being able to restrict the possible references that sharply reduces the novel,
i.e., unexpected information an attacker could obtain, hence reduces the benefit
of a preimage attack greatly.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We proposed PBC - a method that computes the bibliographic coupling strength
of documents without revealing the bibliographic references involved in the com-
putation. To realize PBC, we invented a new PSI approach that uses hashed
feature subsets to prevent preimage and dictionary attacks. The security of the
approach is adjustable to the computing resources that might be spent on the
specific problem by increasing the number of features included in a subset, and
by using hash functions with higher bit-lengths.
3https://dblp.uni-trier.de
4https://dblp.uni-trier.de/faq/23593238.html
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We showed that PBC using SHA1 capably identifies similar documents in
a large corpus without causing hash collisions. We demonstrated that a subset
size of k = 2 achieves the best trade-off between computation time, required
storage, and attack resistance. A subset size of k > 2 causes a steep rise in
computation time and is therefore limited to documents with small numbers of
references.
Hashed document feature subsets show promise for building a future decen-
tralized PD service since accuracy would only decrease if a document pair does
not contain at least two matching references. As shown in our prior work [6],
an overlap of two references generally does not constitute a similarity that is
significant enough to identify a document as suspicious of plagiarism.
In the future, we will allow encrypting the document IDs of unpublished
documents. By doing so, the PDS can still detect that an input document over-
laps with already existing unpublished documents in the distributed reference
database. However, the PDS can no longer determine the number of documents
with which the input document shares content. By using incentive mechanisms,
the owner of the unpublished document is motivated to share the document with
the PDS privately. To avoid false positives, authors can, e.g., submit previous
versions of rejected grant proposals to prove that they were the authors of the
earlier document.
In this initial study, we focused entirely on Bibliographic Coupling and
excluded more sophisticated citation-based plagiarism detection methods like
Greedy Citation Tiling and Longest Common Citation Sequences [5]. In the
future, we will devise content protection methods that support pattern-based
PD approaches that use mathematical features [15] and images [13]. We will
analyze these detection methods and examine which features need to be masked
and which features can be shared openly during the detection process without
revealing any semantic information.
In summary, we successfully conducted the first step towards our vision of a
decentralized content protecting plagiarism detection system [8]. The findings
of our initial study confirm our research direction of using hashed document
features, such as references, in-text citations, images, and formulae, to devise
such a service.
To ensure the reproducibility of our experiments, our data and code are
available at https:// github.com/ag-gipp/20CppdData
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